In the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie (DZPhil 74/1, 2026), I have published a book review of Tim Henning’s Wissenschaftsfreiheit und Moral (Suhrkamp 2024).

I recognise Henning’s book as an important contribution to the ongoing debate on academic freedom: using the tools of analytic philosophy, he argues that moral criticism of research does not constitute an illegitimate restriction on academic freedom — a charge that conservative actors regularly level against critical research. His key argument turns on the concept of error costs: the more severe the consequences of a scientific claim turning out to be false, the higher the evidential standard must be. In this way, moral considerations find a legitimate place within an otherwise evidentialist conception of science.

I also identify the limits of this approach. Henning’s evidentialism presupposes a clean separation between descriptive science and moral evaluation that cannot be sustained in the social sciences and humanities. As a result, his narrow framework implicitly excludes the bulk of critical research — precisely the research at the centre of the academic freedom debate. I further situate the book within a first phase of the debate (alleged internal restrictions on academic freedom by critical researchers) and contrast it with the current second phase, which concerns actual state-imposed restrictions: in Germany in the context of the debate over antisemitism definitions, and in the United States through the Trump administration’s right-authoritarian higher education policy.

Cite and Read

Schubert, Karsten (2026): Zwischen konservativer und kritischer Epistemologie. In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 74 (1), 106–116. https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2026-0008


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